The European Union (EU) likes to present itself as a decarbonization pioneer. Its ambition to make Europe the first climate neutral continent by 2050 has been translated into bold measures that challenge the economic and social status quo. The European Green Deal, as the cornerstone climate project of the past European Commission approved in January 2020, set in motion key energy and environmental legislations and established strategies for different sectors.
But now, climate-skeptic voices and opposition to climate efforts are gaining political weight, as shown by recent trends in the European Parliament election results earlier this month. While Europeans still see climate change as a major challenge, discontent with financial developments and concerns about defense and security rank even higher in their priorities, according to the latest Eurobarometer polling.
With the changing composition of the European Parliament, some of the biggest implications will concern climate policy. A weakened EU climate agenda could result in the continent falling short of decarbonization targets. It could also influence partners abroad to mirror more lax climate policies. In the face of these shifts, Europe’s policymakers need a resilient environmental policy profile that endures political shifts and builds trust in the longevity of EU climate action among voters and international partners.
The legacy of a climate consensus
In the 2019 European Parliament elections, climate change was a decisive topic for voters. Following the vote, the then nominee for European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, promptly pledged a strong focus on climate action as part of her eventually successful bid to secure the approval by the European Parliament. The Commission turned her pledge into action with the European Green Deal, which comprised numerous ambitious decarbonization policies. Von der Leyen called it Europe’s “man on the moon” moment.
To align EU legislation with the intermediate goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030, the Fit for 55 package expanded the EU emissions trading system, introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for carbon-intensive imports, and set new standards for the land use, transportation, and energy sectors, among other policies. Furthermore, at least 30 percent of the European recovery package funding was allocated for climate action.
Despite the initial progress, the wind in the sails of the EU’s green agenda now appears diminished. A sluggish economic recovery, stubbornly persistent inflation, and rising energy costs—in part, a downstream effect of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—have resulted in the green agenda as a target for farmers’ protests and rallies.
Interest group pressure and conservative opposition to climate action have hampered green policies at the national level, too. A watered down German climate change law, climate-skepticism among Italian political leadership, and French President Emmanuel Macron calling in May of last year for a “pause” of EU environmental regulations exemplify the simultaneous nature of developments on the member state and the EU level.
Green parties lost in this year’s European Parliament elections, greatly diminishing their political weight in the body. Some commentators have already written the obituary of the bloc’s green agenda, arguing that “Europe’s green moment is over.”
What’s next for the Green Deal?
The center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s party group and the largest in the European Parliament, reaffirmed Europe’s leading role in global climate action in its 2024 party platform. At the same time, it advocates for technological neutral approaches and distances itself from the Greens and Socialists, whose position the EPP calls “ideological” in their manifesto. The rejection of a contentious bill on pesticide use in 2023 demonstrates the group’s ambiguous stance on environmental legislation as it restrained von der Leyen’s Green Deal objectives to foster sustainability in the agricultural sector. Newly and reelected EPP members are “completely divided on where to go with the Green Deal,” according to Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke, emphasizing the limbo in which the project currently hangs.
In the incoming European Parliament, support for the Green Deal will continue to come from the center-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, which highlights the social aspects of a just climate transition, and the liberal Renew Europe group, which emphasizes the need for pragmatic implementation. While the Greens proposed an even more ambitious Green and Social Deal as a major investment plan, other left groups are more critical of the bloc’s approach to decarbonization.
Further to the right, the green backlash has become a rallying cry for conservative and far-right political groups, such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the populist Identity and Democracy (ID), which oppose the Green Deal, advocate for local climate strategies, and call decarbonization targets unrealistic. A more prominent role of the ECR and ID in the European Parliament, following their gains in the European elections could slow down the already insufficient emissions reduction and impede the effective implementation of Green Deal policies.
However, it’s too soon to declare the death of the green agenda. It will, instead, likely be deprioritized, contending with competing policy interests. While the overlapping crises of climate change, pandemic recovery, the war in Ukraine, and the resulting inflationary trends have drawn away the electorate’s focus on climate issues, environmental concerns remained salient for voters. It is unlikely that the European Green Deal will be abandoned, especially if von der Leyen stays on as European Commission president.
The new distribution of the parliamentary seats opens possibilities for a more conservative majority but also for coalitions with center-left parties. While the three main centrist groups have reportedly reached an agreement on top European Union posts with von der Leyen as Commission president, it is not a given that she will gather enough votes in parliament. Given the new distribution of parliament seats, Green parties might therefore be the key to securing von der Leyen a second term and thus exert influence on climate protection to remain prioritized.
Regardless, even a weakened climate agenda would be a mistake. Both for political and strategic reasons, European policymakers cannot abandon the green transition. Other priorities may, rightly, deserve attention, but the climate crisis must not be ignored. Europe is, after all, the fastest-warming continent, according a recent report by the United Nations and EU. Temperatures there are rising at around twice the global average.
To ensure the viability and centrality of the Green Deal in the new European parliament, officials will need to link policy issues and make the case that the green transition can help the competitiveness agenda. A focus on implementation rather than new legislation is likely. In this consideration, a nonpartisan commitment to technologically sound and ecologically just climate action is necessary to accommodate voters’ demands and bridge party gaps. This will require political leadership, especially from von der Leyen and her EPP party group, which has yet to find a common line regarding the future of the European Green Deal.
Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Further reading
Image: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presents a “communication” detailing the EU’s “Green Deal Industrial Plan” to ensure the bloc plays a leading role in clean tech production, partly in EU’s response to the US Inflation Reduction Act, which will provide $369 billion of subsidies for electric vehicles and other green products, in Brussels, Belgium February 1, 2023. REUTERS/Yves Herman